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INTENT-TO-BENEFIT RULE: WHAT WE CAN 
STILL LEARN FROM CADY, ROBERTS 
Craig W. Davis∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 1997, while in the process of dissolving their marriage, 
David and Donna Yun were discussing their post-nuptial settlement 
agreement.1  David, president of Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc., 
explained to his wife that the value of Scholastic stock included in his 
statement of assets reflected an anticipated $10-per-share decline in 
value due to an unfavorable earnings report, which was to be 
announced within the week.2  At her husband’s request, Mrs. Yun 
agreed not to disclose this confidence to anyone except her lawyer.3 
Shortly thereafter, two days before the earnings announcement, 
Donna Yun telephoned her attorney, Sam Weiss, from her real-estate 
office to discuss the assets statement.  Jerry Burch, a co-worker and 
fellow sales agent, was present and standing within feet of Mrs. Yun as 
she explained the Scholastic stock price discrepancy to Weiss.  That 
evening, Mrs. Yun and Burch attended a trade banquet together,4 
where they discussed the Scholastic earnings situation.5 
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 1 SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2003).  See generally M. Anne 
Kaufold, Casenote, Defining Misappropriation: The Spousal Duty of Loyalty and the 
Expectation of Benefit, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1489 (2004) (setting forth facts and holdings 
of Yun). 
 2 Id.  On the weekend of February 15–16, 1997, Scholastic was trading at $65 per 
share.  The poor earnings announcement was to be made on February 20, and David 
Yun anticipated a drop in price to about $55 per share.  Id. 
 3 Id. at 1267 & n.4. 
 4 Id. at 1268. 
 5 SEC v. Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1356–57 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated by 327 F.3d 
1263 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268.  Over the course of the SEC’s 
subsequent investigation Burch and Yun changed their story regarding when and 
where the tip occurred.  It is not entirely clear whether the alleged tip occurred as a 
result of Mrs. Yun’s telephone call to her lawyer or at the party later that evening, 
and the matter was submitted for the jury’s consideration.  Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 
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The next morning, the day before Scholastic’s earnings 
announcement, Jerry Burch placed an order through his broker to 
purchase approximately $20,000 worth of two-day puts.6  The 
following day the price of Scholastic stock dropped forty percent in 
response to the earnings report, closing at $36 per share.  Burch then 
sold his options, reaping a profit of more than one quarter of a 
million dollars.7 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or 
“Commission”) began an investigation into Burch’s trading activities 
within hours of his covering trades.8  As a result of its investigation, 
the Commission brought a civil action against both Donna Yun and 
Burch, alleging that the pair had violated section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 19349 and Rule 10b-510 promulgated 
thereunder.  Since there was no contention of any wrongdoing by 
David Yun in disclosing the earnings information to his wife, and 
since Donna Yun was not an insider of Scholastic, the SEC brought its 
action under the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability.11  
Following a jury determination against them, the defendants moved 
for judgment as a matter of law, or a new trial,12 contending that they 
lacked the requisite state of mind insofar as Donna Yun, the alleged 
tipper, did not intend to benefit from tipping Burch.13  The United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the 
motions, holding that, under the misappropriation theory, a Rule 
10b-5 violation did not require a showing that the tipper intended to 
 
1356–57.  The Court of Appeals did not focus on this issue, treating both possibilities 
as equally subject to its analysis.  See Yun, 327 F.3d 1263. 
 6 Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268; Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.  A put is an option 
contract which gives the purchaser the right to sell a particular security at a 
predetermined price at any time before a specified expiration date.  LAWRENCE G. 
MCMILLAN, OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT 866 (3d ed. 1992).  Since the put 
option confers the right to sell at a certain price (the strike price), its value increases 
algorithmically to the extent that the price of the underlying stock decreases below 
the strike price.  See id. at 838–39.  A forty-eight hour option is a substantially risky 
investment, being in essence a wager on the immediate short-term movement of a 
stock’s price.  If the underlying security is trading above the strike price at 
expiration, the options are worthless.  Burch’s two-day puts expired the day after 
Scholastic’s scheduled earnings announcement. 
 7 Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268. 
 8 Id. 
 9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). 
 11 See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1267; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997) (adopting misappropriation theory); infra Part I.B. 
 12 Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. 
 13 Id. at 1350. 
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benefit from the tip.14 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
disagreed, holding that the state-of-mind requirement for tippers was 
the same—an intent to benefit from the tip15—whether the tipper was 
an outsider-misappropriator or a classic corporate insider.16 
The Commission’s effort, as exemplified in Yun, to curtail the 
reach of the intent-to-benefit requirement is consistent with its 
historically persistent advocacy of a far-reaching insider trading ban 
under a theory of equal access to market information.17  The upshot 
of the SEC’s approach is the imposition of insider trading liability 
whenever a person trades with the benefit of an informational 
imbalance, however gained.  In opposition to the SEC’s push for 
relatively unrestrained liability, the United States Supreme Court has 
consistently limited the scope of Rule 10b-5 by interpreting the Rule 
as an antifraud provision.18  As a result of the Court’s fraud-based 
approach, insider trading liability has hinged on two prerequisites: 
(1) a requirement of a breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty as 
supplying the requisite fraudulent act19 and (2) a state-of-mind 
requirement that is consistent with a theory of fraud;20 for example, 
 
 14 Id. at 1353. 
 15 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that test for breach of duty 
owed to corporation by corporate insider is whether tipping of inside information 
would benefit tipper); infra notes 72–96 and accompanying text. 
 16 Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280.  The court noted the differing opinions on this matter 
among the federal courts.  Id. at 1274–75 & nn.25, 26.  Compare id. at 1276 (requiring 
an intent to benefit under misappropriation theory), and SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-
1336-RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992) (applying 
improper motive test under misappropriation theory), with United States v. Libera, 
989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring breach of duty by tipper and knowledge 
of breach by tippee, “without more”), and SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting improper motive test under misappropriation theory).  See 
also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting disagreement on issue but 
declining to resolve it). 
 17 See infra Parts I.A, II. 
 18 See infra notes 31–45 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra Part II.A. 
 20 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).  The Yun decision also 
highlights some of the ambiguities which have developed in civil actions for insider 
trading regarding the state-of-mind requirement in general.  The United States 
Supreme Court’s early pronouncement that scienter was an essential element of Rule 
10b-5 claims, Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197, 214, was followed by indications that a 
lesser standard might suffice in certain situations.  See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (implying 
a negligence standard by stating that tippee may be liable if he knew or should have 
known his receipt of nonpublic information was result of impropriety).  Moreover, 
the Court’s deferral of the issue of whether recklessness is a sufficient standard for 
liability, Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12, has predictably led to disagreement 
among the federal courts.  See, e.g., Yun, 327 F.3d at 1274–75 (rejecting recklessness 
standard); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting 
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the intent-to-benefit rule. 
The facts of Yun provide a felicitous opportunity to explore this 
tension between two opposing theories of insider trading liability as it 
relates to the intent-to-benefit requirement, as well as more universal 
concerns of the legitimacy and justifiable scope of the prohibition of 
insider trading.  Yun sets out two possible factual contexts in which an 
illegal tip might have occurred.  Either Jerry Burch was a chance, 
inadvertent recipient of inside information when he overheard Mrs. 
Yun’s telephone conversation,21 or he received the information by 
means of a deliberate breach of confidence by Mrs. Yun when she 
willfully divulged the information to him at a social gathering.22  
Under the SEC’s theory, there need be no intent to benefit from 
providing a tip in order for there to be insider trading liability.23  
Thus, Jerry Burch would be liable for insider trading in either case, 
simply because he took advantage of an informational imbalance, 
without regard to how that advantage came about.  The Commission 
sought to accomplish this result by eliminating the intent-to-benefit 
requirement when an action is brought under the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading liability.24 
An exploration of the doctrinal underpinnings of insider trading 
law will show, however, that this approach is inconsistent with the law 
as the courts have interpreted it under Rule 10b-5.  Analysis of the 
seminal SEC decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.25 will reveal that the 
 
recklessness standard).  In Yun, although the appellate court disagreed with the trial 
court on the state-of-mind issue, the higher court affirmed the denial of defendants’ 
motions for judgment as a matter of law since there was sufficient factual basis for 
finding the intent standard had been met.  Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280.  The court did, 
however, grant the defendants a new trial based on the jury instructions given in the 
lower court, which articulated a recklessness standard and did not include 
instruction as to the intent requirement.  Id. at 1282. 
It should perhaps be noted that the state of mind required for criminal 
prosecutions of inside traders is more clearly defined, both judicially and statutorily.  
See generally Brian J. Carr, Note, Culpable Intent Required for All Criminal Insider Trading 
Convictions After United States v. O’Hagan, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (1999).  The present 
analysis will be confined to the state-of-mind requirement for civil actions, where a 
willful intent to violate the securities laws is not purported to be an issue.  See id. at 
1194–1210.  It is also worth noting that civil actions under Rule 10b-5 are brought by 
and large by the SEC.  Although there is a judicially created implied private right of 
action under Rule 10b-5, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 
6 (1971), such actions are rarely brought, owing largely to statutory restrictions on 
class actions for securities fraud and limits on damage awards.  See STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 123–24 (1999). 
 21 Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268. 
 22 Id.; Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–57. 
 23 See Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1353. 
 24 See id.; infra text accompanying notes 243–48. 
 25 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
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SEC’s current position is, and has been for some time, based on a 
misconception of the idea of fairness as set forth in Cady, Roberts as 
one of the doctrinal pillars of the insider trading ban.26  This analysis 
will also show that the Supreme Court, in contrast to the SEC, has for 
the most part correctly applied Cady, Roberts by emphasizing that the 
Cady, Roberts rationale bases liability on the abuse of a relationship of 
trust.27  This abuse, and not mere informational inequality, gives rise 
to the unfairness inherent in insider trading.  The exegesis of Cady, 
Roberts will also confirm the notion, strongly implied in Supreme 
Court decisions,28 that the misappropriation theory is not 
fundamentally distinct from the classical theory.29 
Part I of this Comment will survey the development of Rule 10b-
5 as a regulatory mechanism for the prosecution of insider trading.  
Part I.A will trace the development of the classical theory of insider 
trading, based on fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders with 
whom an insider trades.  The misappropriation theory of liability, 
premised on duties owed to the source of the misappropriated 
information, will be detailed in Part I.B.  In Part II, the theoretical 
and policy rationales underlying insider trading prohibitions will be 
explored and analyzed afresh with an eye towards establishing a 
doctrinal setting in which to analyze the intent-to-benefit 
requirement.  This discussion will take its cue from the seminal 
opinion of former SEC Chairman William Cary in Cady, Roberts.30  The 
dual prongs of the Cady, Roberts rationale, breach of trust and 
fairness, will be analyzed in Parts II.A and II.B, respectively, to 
determine their appropriateness vis-à-vis the insider trading 
prohibition and the parameters that they should set for liability. 
Finally, in Part III, the conclusions and insights gained in Part II 
will be brought to bear on the current controversy (the state-of-mind 
problem as exemplified in Yun), to resolve that particular issue and 
to give more definite shape to the scope of the insider trading 
prohibition in general. 
I.  BACKGROUND—THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193431 is an 
enabling provision, the purpose of which was the prevention of 
 
 26 Id. at 912; infra Part II.B. 
 27 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912; infra Part II. 
 28 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 29 See infra Part III. 
 30 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907. 
 31 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
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surreptitious manipulation of securities markets.32  The statute 
prohibits “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” 
employed “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” 
that contravenes any rules and regulations that the SEC may 
promulgate “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.”33  While the legislative purpose behind 
section 10(b) seems to have been the regulation of abusive acts of 
speculation and market manipulation that misrepresent the value 
and liquidity of securities,34 the United States Supreme Court has 
consistently construed the statute as a broader measure against 
securities fraud.35 
Rule 10b-5,36 promulgated by the SEC in 1942 under authority of 
section 10(b), was originally drafted in response to a particular 
instance of market manipulation; namely, a corporate director falsely 
talking down the corporation’s financial condition and then buying 
the shares of credulous stockholders at a profitable discount.37  From 
this rather humble and exigent beginning, the rule has become the 
federal government’s indispensable weapon in combating insider 
trading,38 a problem to which it was not originally addressed.39 
Rule 10b-5 prohibits “any person, directly or indirectly” from 
“(a) . . . employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . or 
(c) . . . engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
 
 32 See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990). 
 33 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 34 Thel, supra note 32, at 385–86. 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagen, 521 U.S. 642, 670 (1997) (stating that 
section 14(e) of the Exchange Act is modeled on the antifraud provisions of section 
10(b)) (citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985)); Central Bank 
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 198 (1994) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “acknowledged purpose” of section 10(b) is “to 
strengthen the antifraud remedies of the common law”); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 
646 (1983) (stating that section 10(b) is one of the antifraud provisions of the 
Exchange Act). 
 36 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). 
 37 See Conference on the Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 
922 (1967) (remarks of co-drafter Milton Freeman), cited in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.32 (1976). 
 38 Then-Justice Rehnquist’s enduring remark on the phenomenon of Rule 10b-5 
bears repeating: The rule had become “a judicial oak which has grown from little 
more than a legislative acorn.”  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 737 (1975). 
 39 Cf. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (1991) (Winter, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he law [of insider trading] is far enough down 
th[e Rule 10b-5] road . . . that a court . . . has no option but to continue the route.”). 
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connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”40  A line of 
Supreme Court cases has articulated the necessary elements of any 
Rule 10b-5 claim as those inhering in an action for common-law 
fraud.  In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,41 the Court limited 
standing in civil actions brought under Rule 10b-5 to those who 
traded in a security in connection with fraudulent activity proscribed 
by the Rule.42  In holding that Rule 10b-5 did not proscribe mere 
negligence, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder43 affirmed the scienter 
requirement for Rule 10b-5 securities fraud.  The materiality 
requirement of common-law fraud was subsumed under the federal 
securities laws in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.44  Under the 
Northway standard, an omitted fact is considered material “if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to” act.45 
A. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading 
Rule 10b-5 was first used to combat insider trading in the SEC’s 
groundbreaking decision, In re Cady, Roberts.46  Cady, Roberts premised 
 
 40 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 41 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 42 Id. at 754–55. 
 43 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 44 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 45 Id. at 449.  Northway involved the proxy rules of section 14(a).  The standard 
was adopted in the Rule 10b-5 context in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 
(1988).  In insider trading cases, the standard is virtually self-satisfying.  The very act 
of trading speaks to the materiality of the inside information. 
Causation is of particular interest in the securities fraud context.  Assuming that 
a hypothesis of efficient securities markets accurately reflects economic reality, which 
in the high-volume, high-liquidity, impersonal securities exchanges is a fair 
assumption, then securities prices reflect a discounting of all publicly available 
information.  This is the so-called “weak” efficient markets hypothesis.  The strong 
hypothesis, rather less adhered to, is that securities prices in efficient markets 
discount all information, whether or not it is public and available.  Interestingly, the 
strong form of the hypothesis takes into account information reaching the markets 
through clandestine channels, like insider trading.  See generally Eugene F. Fama, 
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).  
Similarly, any omissions or misinformation will also be discounted.  It is therefore 
reasonable to presume reliance, or transaction causation, whenever trades are 
conducted on a national exchange in a security as to which there has been a material 
misstatement or omission.  See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.  This fraud-on-the-market 
theory, id., makes causation in securities fraud cases a somewhat pat proposition.  
The Supreme Court has accepted the presumption of reliance under the fraud-on-
the-market theory.  Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 
(1972).  But cf. Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn & Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (holding that causation of actual pecuniary damages, or loss causation, 
could not be presumed). 
 46 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
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liability for insider training on a willful violation of the federal 
securities laws, specifically Rule 10b-5.47  The opinion of SEC 
chairman Cary pronounced what has become the accepted rule 
governing insider trading and articulated the underlying doctrinal 
rationale for its prohibition.  The disclose or abstain rule prescribes 
that insiders must either disclose nonpublic, material information to 
which they are privy by virtue of their position as insiders or, if 
disclosure would be improper or is not feasible, abstain from 
trading.48  While officers, directors and controlling shareholders came 
within the rule’s constraints, 
[t]hese three groups . . . do not exhaust the classes of persons 
upon whom there is such an obligation [to disclose or abstain 
from trading].  Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal 
elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly 
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a 
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, 
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes 
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those 
with whom he is dealing.49 
The dual concerns of Cady, Roberts—respecting fiduciary 
relationships and avoiding unfairness—have driven the federal 
courts’ insider trading jurisprudence since SEC Chairman Cary 
committed their expression to paper.50  These two prongs of the Cady, 
Roberts rationale anchor contrary tendencies, which have since guided 
and defined the debate over insider trading.  On the one hand is the 
Supreme Court’s dogged persistence in basing insider trading 
liability on a breach of duty, and, on the other, the SEC’s ceaseless, 
though largely futile attempts to broaden the scope of Rule 10b-5, in 
the name of fairness, under a theory of equal access to information 
for all market participants.51  The post–Cady, Roberts development of 
insider trading law manifests the tension inherent in these opposing 
viewpoints. 
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,52 a paradigm insider trading 
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
expressly adopted Cady, Roberts’ disclose or abstain rule under a 
theory of equal access to information.53  Texas Gulf Sulphur involved 
 
 47 Id. at 908–10. 
 48 Id. at 911. 
 49 Id. at 912 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 50 See discussion infra Part II. 
 51 See discussion infra Part II. 
 52 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
 53 Id. at 848. 
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insider trading by corporate officers after the firm’s explorations 
uncovered a potentially massive ore deposit in Ontario, Canada.54  
While the insiders were buying up TGS stock, the corporation was 
buying all of the land and mineral rights in the area that it could. 
Appraising the policy underlying Rule 10b-5, the court deemed 
the congressional purpose behind the rule to be “that all members of 
the investing public should be subject to identical market risks . . . .”55  
In holding that the disclose or abstain rule applied to anyone who 
traded while in possession of material, nonpublic information,56 the 
Second Circuit erected a daunting ban on trading with an 
informational advantage, however gained.57  But the triumph of the 
equal access theory in Texas Gulf Sulphur was not to abide. 
In Chiarella v. United States,58 the Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to trim back the broad prohibition of Texas Gulf Sulphur 
by rejecting the equal access theory.59  In an opinion by Justice 
Powell, the Court emphasized the first prong of the Cady, Roberts 
rationale, respecting fiduciary relationships.  This reemphasis acted 
to delimit the fairness consideration, which had been the dominant, 
if not the exclusive doctrinal consideration in the Texas Gulf Sulphur 
decision, by restricting its purview to those who have a duty to 
disclose.60 
Vincent Chiarella worked for a printing company that printed 
merger and acquisition documents.61  He managed to decrypt the 
documents of his firm’s clients, discerned the identities of the 
companies involved, and traded their stock.62  The Court read the 
first Cady, Roberts prong narrowly, for although Chiarella had indeed 
gained access to the information by virtue of insider status, he was not 
an insider of the companies whose stock he had traded, and thus 
owed neither them nor their shareholders any fiduciary duties.63  
Absent a duty to disclose, Chiarella’s silence could not render him 
 
 54 Id. at 843. 
 55 Id. at 852. 
 56 Id. at 848. 
 57 Under the Second Circuit’s all-encompassing rule, a local who observed the 
hurried activities of TGS’s agents, took an educated guess as to what might be going 
on, and bought shares of TGS stock, would presumably be liable for insider trading.  
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 47–48; see also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 
2000) (providing example of similar set of circumstances). 
 58 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 59 Id. at 231. 
 60 Id; see also discussion infra Part II. 
 61 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 231. 
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liable for defrauding anyone under Rule 10b-5.64  The Court expressly 
rejected the lower court’s contention that Chiarella, by virtue of his 
position as a regular recipient of material, nonpublic, corporate 
information, owed a duty to all market participants.65  In other words, 
the Court rejected the equal access theory’s insistence on 
informational parity and identical market risks. 
Chiarella is a pivotal insider trading case for several reasons.  
First, the Supreme Court adopted Chairman Cary’s rationale in Cady, 
Roberts for the ban on insider trading.66  At the same time, however, it 
rejected the equal access theory then advanced by the SEC as 
overbroad, and made clear the Supreme Court’s determination to 
limit insider trading liability to instances where fiduciary duties were 
disregarded—a person would not be liable for insider trading simply 
because of an informational advantage.  This, the Court implied, was 
an erroneous reading of Cady, Roberts.67  And finally, the Court 
declined to adopt the misappropriation theory.  Chief Justice Burger, 
in dissent, argued that a duty to disclose should arise whenever 
nonpublic information was gained improperly.68  The majority 
declined to address the matter only because it had not been raised 
below.69  Chiarella is thus the model case for the classical theory of 
insider trading, which requires that a fiduciary breach a duty to 
disclose owed to the persons with whom he trades.70  The 
misappropriation theory would have to find sustenance among the 
federal circuit courts until the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in 
United States v. O’Hagan.71 
Tippee liability was analyzed within the classical liability 
framework in Dirks v. SEC.72  Raymond Dirks was a stockbroker and 
analyst who received inside information concerning Equity Funding 
of America from Ronald Secrist, an insider at Equity Funding.73  
Secrist informed Dirks that Equity Funding had been deliberately 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 233. 
 66 See id. at 226–28. 
 67 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–28, 232 n.14. 
 68 Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice’s argument plainly had 
some force.  See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 69 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236. 
 70 The SEC was also dissatisfied with the result in Chiarella.  In response, it 
promulgated Rule 14e-3, which prohibits anyone from trading on material, 
nonpublic information regarding a tender offer, regardless of whether or to whom 
fiduciary duties are owed.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2004). 
 71 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 72 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 73 Id. at 648–49. 
  
2004 COMMENT 273 
overstating its assets on a grand scale.  Secrist, who had unavailingly 
informed regulators of the fraud, asked Dirks to investigate the 
matter and to disclose his findings.  Dirks confirmed Secrist’s 
allegations and, during the course of his investigation, discussed the 
matter with clients and other investors.  While Dirks himself did not 
trade Equity Funding stock, his advisees liquidated substantial 
holdings based on the allegations of accounting fraud.74  During this 
time, the price of Equity Funding stock declined $11 per share, a 
more than forty-percent drop.  Trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange was halted two weeks after Dirks began his investigation, 
and the SEC subsequently uncovered the fraud after impounding the 
corporation’s records.75  Dirks himself, with consummate 
bureaucratic irony, was implicated as a tippee.  The SEC censured 
Dirks under a theory that was an unabashed repudiation of Chiarella.76  
The Commission asserted that the disclose or abstain rule applied to 
everyone who received material, nonpublic information from a 
corporate insider, “regardless of their motivation or occupation.”77  
But, relying on the fiduciary duty rationale of Cady, Roberts, as 
conceived in Chiarella, the Court both rejected the SEC’s assertion 
that a tippee inherits an insider’s fiduciary duty simply by virtue of 
the tip and repudiated the equal access theory upon which it was 
based.78  The duty to disclose “arises from the relationship between 
parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire information 
because of his position in the market.”79  In other words, not 
everybody who possesses inside information is barred by the federal 
securities laws from trading.80 
While the Court agreed that a tippee’s duty to disclose was 
derivative of that of the insider who provided the tip,81 it explained 
that the duty is inherited not simply by virtue of the tip, but because 
the tip constitutes a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty to 
shareholders.82  “[T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a 
 
 74 Id. at 649. 
 75 Id. at 650. 
 76 Id. at 652 (citing In re Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, [1981 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,939, at ¶ 83,951 (Jan. 22, 1981), rev’d, 463 U.S. 
646). 
 77 Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656–57 & n.15. 
 79 Id. at 658 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 n.14) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 80 Id. at 657. 
 81 Id. at 659. 
 82 Id. at 660.  The Court distinguished a corporate officer’s common-law duty to 
the corporate entity from his duty to the shareholders not to trade on inside 
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breach of duty by the insider.”83  It follows that not all disclosures of 
material, nonpublic information are breaches of the “Cady, Roberts 
duty.”84  In a tipping case, therefore, the threshold inquiry is whether 
the tipper breached a fiduciary duty in providing the tip.85  The Court 
established the intent-to-benefit, or improper-motive test as a limiting 
mechanism for determining whether the requisite breach had 
occurred.86  The test provides that if the insider/tipper’s disclosure of 
confidential corporate information results in a benefit to him, then 
the insider has breached his Cady, Roberts duty.87  Only then can a 
fiduciary duty be imputed to the tippee.88  For the insider’s duty to 
pass to the tippee, it must further be shown that the tippee “kn[ew] 
or should [have] know[n]” of the breach.89  Thus, a tippee is 
potentially liable for insider trading only if the tipper’s disclosure 
results in a personal benefit to him, and if the tippee knows, or 
should know, that he received the tip “in breach of a duty by a person 
having a special relationship to the [corporation] not to disclose the 
information.”90 
The personal benefit (or improper motive) test is not as 
favorable to tippees as may appear at first blush, for the Court 
defined “personal benefit” broadly.  The benefit may be direct or 
indirect.91  It could include a benefit to a tipper’s family member, for 
example by making a gift of the tip.92  The Court further determined 
that personal benefit was not limited to financial gain but might also 
consist in a “reputational benefit.”93  For example, it might enhance 
the tipper’s standing in a way that will later bring him a higher salary, 
or more clients.94  In sum, if the tipper’s motive for disclosing the 
information is an improper one, then the tippee will inherit a Cady, 
Roberts duty if he knew (or should have known) of the impropriety of 
 
information.  See id. at 653 n.10.  The latter is the “Cady, Roberts duty” to disclose or 
abstain.  Id. at 662.  See discussion infra Part II.B.  See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, 
at 59 (speculating that Cady, Roberts duty might be a matter of federal law and distinct 
from state-law duties of corporate officers). 
 83 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663. 
 84 Id. at 661–62. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 662. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660; see also id. at 661 (stating that tippee who knows of 
breach by insider inherits duty, but not mentioning those who should know). 
 90 Id. at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Id. at 662. 
 92 Id. at 664. 
 93 Id. at 663. 
 94 See id. 
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the tip.95  In Dirks, Ronald Secrist’s motive for tipping Dirks was to 
uncover massive fraud at Equity Funding, not, the Court concluded, 
to benefit personally.96 
B. The Misappropriation Theory 
In absolving Raymond Dirks, the Dirks majority noted that he did 
not “misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity 
Funding.”97  This might have been a signal that the Court, given the 
proper factual setting, would be willing to reconsider Chief Justice 
Burger’s dissenting support in Chiarella of the misappropriation 
theory.98  That factual setting was amply provided by James O’Hagan, 
a partner in the Minneapolis law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.99  Dorsey 
& Whitney had been retained by Grand Metropolitan (“Grand Met”) 
in its planned takeover bid of Pillsbury.100  O’Hagan became aware of 
 
 95 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 96 Id. at 667.  The Court’s language is mildly ambiguous on this point, alternating 
between simply requiring that the tip result in a benefit to the tipper, id. at 662 
(“[T]he test is whether the insider personally will benefit . . . from his disclosure.”), 
663 (test is “whether the insider receives a . . . benefit from the disclosure”), 667 
(“The tippers received no . . . benefit.”), and speaking of the tipper’s motive or 
purpose in making the tip.  Id. at 662 (“Whether disclosure is a breach of duty . . . 
depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure.”), 667 (“[T]he tippers were 
motivated by a desire to expose the fraud.”).  In turn, the lower courts have similarly 
equivocated on the precise requirement.  Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274 
(11th Cir. 2003) (intent to benefit), with SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 
2000) (simply a resulting benefit).  Nevertheless, the tipper’s purpose is clearly the 
point of the test.  See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (“Whether disclosure is a breach of duty 
therefore depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure.”). 
The determination of whether the tipper breached a duty to shareholders and 
whether the tippee inherited that duty is distinct from the determination of scienter, 
or intent to defraud.  Id. at 663 n.23.  The benefit test, based on the tipper’s intent, 
speaks to whether or not a tippee owes a duty to shareholders, see id. at 662, not 
whether he himself acted with scienter when he traded, which is a separate inquiry.  
See id. at 663.  Thus, the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 applies separately to 
tippees.  See id. at 663 n.23.  This follows from the Court’s earlier decision in Aaron v. 
SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).  Aaron was in turn a clarification of the Court’s decision in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which left undecided whether the 
scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 applied in actions for injunctive relief.  Id. at 193 
n.12.  In Aaron, the Court was unequivocal.  The Ernst decision “ineluctably leads to 
the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.”  Aaron, 
446 U.S. at 691. 
 97 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665. 
 98 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  As noted supra text 
accompanying note 69, the majority in Chiarella did not reject the misappropriation 
theory on doctrinal grounds, but rather because the government did not invoke the 
theory at trial.  Id. at 236. 
 99 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997). 
 100 Id. 
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the proposed tender offer and began purchasing Pillsbury call 
options101 and common stock.102  When the merger was announced, 
the price of Pillsbury shares nearly doubled and O’Hagan liquidated 
his holdings for a profit of $4.3 million.103  O’Hagan was subsequently 
indicted on fifty-seven counts, including mail fraud and violations of 
Rules 14e-3 and 10b-5.104 
The unique nature of O’Hagan’s position vis-à-vis the 
corporations affected by his scheme required that the 
misappropriation theory be advanced as the basis of his conviction 
for securities fraud.  That is because O’Hagan’s fiduciary duties ran 
to his law firm, and in turn to its client, Grand Met.  O’Hagan, 
however, traded the stock of Pillsbury, an entity to whom he owed no 
duties at all.105  Since, under the classical theory of insider trading, the 
requisite fraud inheres in the breach of a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders with whom one trades,106 O’Hagan could not be 
convicted under that theory.107  The misappropriation theory was thus 
the only available theory upon which O’Hagan could be convicted. 
The misappropriation theory had been circulating among the 
federal circuits since before the Supreme Court first addressed it, 
inconclusively, in Carpenter v. United States.108  Carpenter involved a 
journalist’s misappropriation of pre-publication information from the 
Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column.109  The Court split 
4–4 on the issue of whether the reporter’s conviction under the 
federal securities laws could stand.110  The judgment of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the defendant’s convictions based 
on the misappropriation theory,111 was affirmed simply by reason of 
the evenly divided Court.112  The appeals court had held that a breach 
 
 101 A call is an option contract that gives the purchaser the right to buy the 
underlying security at a predetermined price at any time before a specified 
expiration date.  See MCMILLAN, supra note 6, at 855. 
 102 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48. 
 103 Id. at 648. 
 104 Id. at 648–49. 
 105 See id. at 653 n.5. 
 106 See supra notes 56–69 and accompanying text. 
 107 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
 108 484 U.S. 19 (1987).  See generally Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory 
of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United 
States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 868–78 (2003) (discussing pre-
O’Hagan development of misappropriation theory). 
 109 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22. 
 110 Id. at 24. 
 111 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 
19 (1987) (4–4 decision). 
 112 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. 
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of a duty to one’s employer met the requirement of Rule 10b-5 that 
there be fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even 
though the misappropriator did not trade in his employer’s stock, but 
in the stock of an unrelated entity.113 
The misappropriation theory was tailor-made for O’Hagan.  One 
court has succinctly stated the theory as: 
provid[ing] that Rule 10b-5 is violated when a person (1) 
misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching 
a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and 
(3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) 
regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of 
the traded stock.114 
In O’Hagan, the confidential information regarded a corporate 
merger and O’Hagan’s firm, and thus O’Hagan, owed a duty of 
confidence to Grand Met, but not to the shareholders of Pillsbury, 
whose stock he furtively traded.115  Moreover, O’Hagan’s exploits were 
on their face particularly egregious.116  The Supreme Court upheld 
the misappropriation theory as a valid basis for convicting O’Hagan 
under Rule 10b-5.117  O’Hagan’s misappropriation of confidential 
information, in breach of a duty owed to the source of that 
 
 113 See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had 
previously adopted the misappropriation theory in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 
12 (2d Cir. 1981).  In a subsequent series of cases, the courts in that circuit applied 
the theory to various types of relationships.  See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 
596 (2d Cir. 1993) (print-shop employee’s duty to employer); Carpenter, 791 F.2d 
1024 (journalist’s duty to his newspaper); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(printer’s duty to employer); Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (investment banker’s duty to 
bank); SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (psychiatrist’s duty to 
patient); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (office manager’s duty to 
employer); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (father–son 
relationship), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).  But cf. United States 
v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that requisite fiduciary 
relationship between husband and wife not established for purposes of 
misappropriation theory).  The theory was also gaining favor in other circuits.  See, 
e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 
1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985).  But see United States v. 
O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting misappropriation theory), rev’d, 521 
U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (same). 
 114 SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
July 28, 1992) (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 115 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. 
 116 See id. at 657 n.8, 659 (speaking of O’Hagan’s readiness to betray confidences 
and the illogic of letting him off the hook simply because he defrauded one group as 
opposed to some other group).  Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The 
Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993). 
 117 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659. 
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information, sufficed as the statutorily required “decepti[on] . . . in 
connection with securities transactions.”118 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, described the classical 
theory of insider trading and the misappropriation theory as 
“complementary.”119  Both theories were designed “to protect the 
integrity of the securities markets.”120  The classical theory is a net for 
insiders (and their tippees) who threaten that integrity by abusing 
their positions of trust within the corporation.121  The 
misappropriation theory is designed to snare outsiders (and their 
tippees) who have access to corporate information through a 
relationship that does not entail a duty to the corporation’s 
shareholders, and who misappropriate that information for their 
personal gain.122 
In spite of this expressed complementarity, there is 
disagreement among the lower courts with regard to the 
misappropriation theory’s scope and application,123 as well as a fair 
amount of scholarly rancor over the issue.124  The force driving the 
debate is whether or not the two theories really are different aspects 
of the same general theory, or whether they are in fact based on 
unrelated doctrinal foundations.125  This is the root of the 
disagreement over the respective state-of-mind requirements for 
tippee liability.126  Its resolution turns on a careful analysis of the two-
 
 118 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119 Id. at 652. 
 120 Id. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121 See id. at 652–53. 
 122 See id. at 653. 
 123 Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring intent to 
benefit under misappropriation theory), and SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-
RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992) (applying improper 
motive test under misappropriation theory), with United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 
596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring, “without more,” breach of duty by tipper and 
knowledge of breach by tippee), and SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting improper motive test under misappropriation theory).  See 
also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting disagreement on issue but 
declining to resolve it). 
 124 See, e.g., Steven M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent 
Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1999) 
(complaining that the Supreme Court “ducked, misunderstood, or mishandled 
virtually every issue presented by [the O’Hagan] case”).  Cf. Randall W. Quinn, The 
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the 
(Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865 (2003) 
(defending misappropriation theory). 
 125 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 124; David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A 
Critique of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41 (1998). 
 126 See supra notes 8–24 and accompanying text. 
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pronged rationale for the ban on insider trading as originally 
conceived in Cady, Roberts—respecting relationships of trust and 
fostering fairness in securities markets. 
II. THE “CADY, ROBERTS  DUTY” AND THE CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS 
Outside of academia,127 the idea that insider trading should be 
regulated is by and large an accepted norm of the American legal 
and ethical landscape.128  This is due in no small part to former SEC 
Chairman William Cary’s decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,129 which 
continues to be the driving intellectual force behind the regulation of 
insider trading.130  Although the doctrinal basis for insider trading 
regulation has shifted in emphasis and nuance over time,131 the Cady, 
 
 127 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 125–46 (surveying arguments in support of 
deregulation of insider trading).  But the prohibition of insider trading stems from a 
legitimate social motive to curb certain manifestations of avarice.  Cf. ARISTOTLE, 
ETHICA NICHOMACHEA [NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS] bk. V, chs. 1–5.  Aristotle 
characterizes the unjust or unfair man as the “grasping” or “overreaching” man.  Id. 
at 1129b10–11.  The unjust man takes excessive pleasure in profit and as a result 
grasps for more than his due of goods (or accepts less than his due of harms).  See id. 
at 1130a28–b5.  Pace Gordon Gecko, see WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987), 
if the impulse towards greed is left unchecked, certain segments of society will tend 
to “create subcultures that glorify and rationalize selfishness.”  Donald C. 
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading 
Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1999).  “[T]he deep belief that insider 
trading is a wrong and needs a legal remedy . . . derives from the more fundamental 
attitude that economic power and status demand a strong dose of self-restraint and 
accountability.”  Id.  The mere existence of laws against insider trading is a powerful 
social placebo; a symbol of society’s deep-seated disapproval of the already-
advantaged abusing positions of trust to grasp for even more.  See id.  Professor 
Langevoort speaks of the “mythic” nature of the insider trading ban, meaning its 
usefulness as a symbol of certain cultural values and experiences, as opposed to a 
measure reflecting an empirically precise assessment of legal cause and effect.  Id.  
But see also infra note 204 for a discussion of the role that envy might play in the 
insider trading debate. 
 128 This has not always been the case.  The rule against insiders taking advantage 
of their positions within the corporation to profit from nonpublic information about 
the corporation’s stock price was slow in coming over the first half of the twentieth 
century.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 8–14.  The jurisdictions that did regulate 
insider trading usually limited sanctions to face-to-face transactions where there was 
clear evidence of fraud.  Id. 
On the other hand, Americans’ disapproval of insiders benefiting from their 
advantage vis-à-vis securities markets is as old as the markets themselves.  Alexander 
Hamilton, as the nation’s first treasury secretary, forbade his treasury employees 
from speculating in the then newly created government securities, which were the 
objects of frenzied speculation at the time.  RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
293 (2004). 
 129 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 130 See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1319. 
 131 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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Roberts concerns—respecting fiduciary relationships and ensuring 
fairness with regard to informational advantages gotten from those 
relationships—have remained the metajudicial fonts of all federal 
insider trading law.  From this central notion arises the Cady, Roberts 
duty: A trader of securities might in certain circumstances have a duty 
to disclose inside information in his possession or to abstain from 
trading, when not to do so would be inherently unfair.132  Chairman 
Cary stated the foundational principles underlying this duty with 
perduring incisiveness: 
[This] obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the 
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose 
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the 
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of 
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he 
is dealing.133 
Thus, it is seen that fairness is an element of the Cady, Roberts 
rationale.However, the Cady, Roberts notion of fairness is not 
tantamount to a broad imposition of equality on all market 
participants.  Rather, the “inherent unfairness” with which Cady, 
Roberts is concerned arises only within certain relational contexts; 
namely, those involving a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty. 
A. The Cady, Roberts Duty to Disclose or Abstain 
What has been referred to as the “Cady, Roberts duty”134 has its 
source in the first prong of the preceeding passage: The duty “rests 
[in part on] the existence of a relationship giving access . . . to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose 
and not for the personal benefit of anyone . . . .”135  Significantly, the 
disclose or abstain rule requires a relationship; specifically, one 
providing access to privileged corporate information.136  The 
existence of a relationship is thus paramount with regard to the 
prohibition on insider trading, for without it, there arises no Cady, 
Roberts duty.137  Absent such a duty to abstain from trading,138 
 
 132 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911. 
 133 Id. at 912. 
 134 See supra notes 81–96 and accompanying text. 
 135 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 136 See id. 
 137 See id. 
 138 This is in essence what the duty to disclose or abstain amounts to, since more 
often than not disclosure is impracticable and probably a breach of an officer’s state-
law duties.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 45–46. 
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corporate insiders would be free to profit by trading on nonpublic 
information. 
The meaning of the word “relationship” requires clarification.  It 
is commonly (though imprecisely)139 used to refer to merely 
situational arrangements, as when one describes the location of one 
object in relation to another object (i.e., their “spatial relationship”).  
But “relationship” generally implies some kind of intersubjectivity; 
that is, some kind of association between persons140 (whether legal or 
natural).  This is how the courts have tended to view the matter and, 
in insider trading cases, the relationship at issue is by and large 
viewed as fiduciary in nature.141  The insistence on some special 
relationship of trust and confidence142 is a conscious attempt by the 
Supreme Court to bridle the tendency to treat all informational 
imbalances as coming within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.143  The Court 
has been unwilling to expand liability beyond the scope of an 
implicitly fraud-based144 rule in such a manner absent congressional 
direction.145 
By contrast, the SEC has unflaggingly insisted that even merely 
situational relationships should suffice to bring a person under the 
strictures of the insider trading ban.146  This position is nothing more 
than a permutation of the discredited equal access theory,147 and is 
further flawed by the fact that it completely disregards the fraud basis 
of Rule 10b-5.  While “[s]ection 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall 
provision . . . what it catches must be fraud.”148 
 
 139 See MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1050 (11th ed. 2003). 
 140 See id. 
 141 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228, 232 (noting that duty to disclose or abstain 
arises only from a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence and 
emphasizing that duty to disclose rests on “a specific relationship between two 
parties”); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting Chiarella approvingly); United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). 
 142 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228, 232. 
 143 See id. at 232 n.14 (“A duty arises from the relationship between parties . . . and 
not merely from one’s ability to acquire information because of his position in the 
market.”). 
 144 See supra notes 31–45 and accompanying text. 
 145 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233–35. 
 146 See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1374 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(agreeing with “SEC’s own view that anyone is subject to Rule 10b-5 disclosure 
obligations if he or she has inside information obtained by reason of access to the 
issuer”), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); SEC v. 
Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (involving SEC action brought against 
college football coach who allegedly traded on information overheard at sports 
event). 
 147 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231. 
 148 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35. 
  
282 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:263 
Furthermore, since Rule 10b-5 has been construed as an 
antifraud measure, the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme 
Court, have been compelled to find an act of deception upon which 
to premise liability.149  It follows that for a breach of a state-law 
fiduciary duty to suffice for liability under Rule 10b-5, there must be 
“some element of deception.”150  Insider trading arguably provides the 
requisite act of deception insofar as a breach of a duty to disclose 
involves a deceit upon those to whom the duty is owed.151  Since the 
Cady, Roberts duty is a duty to disclose, its breach qualifies as a deceit 
within the meaning of Rule 10b-5. 
The actual source of the duty to disclose has been a somewhat 
murky issue.152  Common-law fiduciary duties of corporate managers 
are owed to the corporation and derivatively to the corporation’s 
shareholders.153  In Santa Fe v. Green, the Supreme Court rejected the 
idea that breach of these state-law duties in themselves constituted a 
violation of Rule 10b-5.154  The Santa Fe Court, however, left a narrow 
opening in its holding for some “federal fiduciary principle under 
Rule 10b-5. . . .”155  But, it warned, any “federal fiduciary standards” 
should not be so expansive as to “cover the corporate universe.”156  
The Supreme Court subsequently addressed this confusion,157 
somewhat parenthetically, by noting that the Cady, Roberts duty is 
distinct from state common-law fiduciary duties owed by corporate 
managers.158 
The origins of the Cady, Roberts duty are found, not surprisingly, 
in the Cady, Roberts opinion itself.  As originally conceived in Cady, 
Roberts, an insider’s access to privileged corporate information 
created a duty to the investing public, which included, but was not 
 
 149 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977) (finding no 
violation of Rule 10b-5 absent deceit or manipulation); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) 
(2004) (making it unlawful to practice or engage in any “fraud or deceit” in 
connection with securities transactions). 
 150 Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 475. 
 151 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29. 
 152 See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading 
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 192–93 (1991). 
 153 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE pt. V, introductory note 
(1992). 
 154 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479–80 (holding, on federalism grounds, that Rule 
10b-5 does not apply broadly to all instances of “internal corporate 
mismanagement”). 
 155 Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156 Id. at 480 (quoting William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 59–63. 
 158 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 n.10. 
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exclusively comprised of, corporate shareholders.159  Justice Powell 
seems to have acknowledged this in his opinion in Dirks, where he 
uses the phrase “Cady, Roberts duty” no less than six times.160  The Dirks 
opinion may thus be read to some degree, at least implicitly, as 
adopting Chairman Cary’s intended program for a federal common 
law of insider trading that was separate and distinct from state 
corporation law.161  The fine distinctions of state law concerning the 
nature of the fiduciary duties of corporate agents should not, the 
Chairman argued, be invoked in order to take the bite out of federal 
securities laws designed to protect investors and financial markets.162  
The Chairman presciently cautioned that in applying those laws, 
judges should avoid erecting “artificial walls of responsibility.”163 
But that is often what the federal courts have tended to do.  
Courts have at times added unnecessary confusion to insider trading 
law by failing to distinguish the Cady, Roberts duty owed to investors 
from state-law fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.  In doing so, 
they have missed sight of the doctrine’s underlying policy of 
protecting investors from unscrupulous insiders and maintaining the 
integrity of the nation’s financial markets164 by policing the unfair 
abuse of privileged relationships.  Adopting and adhering to this 
germinal rationale for regulating insider trading would produce in a 
more direct fashion results which the courts have been arriving at in a 
contorted manner since the conception of the restrictions on insider 
trading.165 
Moreover, an originalist approach that preserves the Cady, 
Roberts roots of insider trading law would lend itself to a reasonable 
mean between the terminal positions of complete deregulation of 
 
 159 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 910 & n.10, 915 n.29. 
 160 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, 660, 662, 663, 665, 666. 
 161 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 910 n.10 (stating that Securities Exchange Act, in 
effecting its purpose of protecting investors, “constitute[d in part a] far reaching 
federal substantive corporation law”); Cary, supra note 156, at 700 (arguing for 
federal fiduciary principles), cited in Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 480 n.17; Langevoort, supra 
note 127 (discussing Chairman Cary’s project). 
 162 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 909.  It is an unavoidable legislative fact that the 
prohibition of insider trading is meant to protect investors.  “It shall be unlawful . . . 
[t]o . . . contraven[e] . . . such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate . . . for the protection of investors.”  15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b) (2000). 
 163 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 913. 
 164 For an early acknowledgement of the effect of the law on maintaining the 
public’s faith in economic institutions, see Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 154 (1850) 
(expressing concern for adverse effects of fraudulent “puffing” by land auctioneers 
on national real-estate market). 
 165 See Fisch, supra note 152. 
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insider trading, and an overreaching imposition of equality on all 
market participants.  The former position is defended on 
predominantly, if not exclusively, economic grounds166 and is for all 
practical purposes a purely academic matter.167  The latter position is 
the result of a general misunderstanding of the concept of fairness 
and a misreading of that concept as it is used in Cady, Roberts.168 
B. The Concept of Fairness 
The fairness issue can be thought of as the battleground on 
which insider trading law has been waged.  But in order to be a 
workable legal concept, fairness must be conceived within limitations 
that serve to distinguish it from bare equality.  These limits are to be 
found in the Cady, Roberts rationale itself, and are reinforced by a 
conceptual analysis of what it means for something to be fair. 
The competing concepts engaged in the debate are 
diametrically opposed viewpoints on the meaning and role of fairness 
in the regulation of insider trading.  On the one side is the historical 
position of the SEC that fairness is essentially equality; if not an 
absolute equality of information, then equality of access to 
information.169  At the other extreme, proponents of the Law and 
Economics school argue that fairness is a vague and unhelpful legal 
concept, of little value in terms of assessing the scope and legitimacy 
of a prohibition against insider trading.170 
Both positions are open to criticism.  On the one hand, fairness 
need not, and in fact can not, especially in the case of securities 
markets,171 be identified with equality.  Both in general conceptual 
terms, and as expressed in the Cady, Roberts decision, the concept of 
fairness must be interpreted with certain constraints that tend to 
delimit its scope and render it something other than simple equality.  
A philosophical explication of this semantic truism is found in John 
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness.172  Under that theory, “fairness” is 
 
 166 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 125–45. 
 167 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 168 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 169 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 170 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary 
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 323–30. 
 171 See Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules 
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 16 (1984) (observing that broad 
reading of concept of fairness “would ban virtually all trading activity” since trading 
by nature depends on informational inequalities). 
 172 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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defined as describing those social and legal institutions that people 
would choose while in a hypothetical state of ignorance about their 
own personal status, needs, and predilections.173  The resulting 
hypothetical social contract might therefore adopt certain 
inequalities if they were objectively deemed to inure to the benefit of 
all.174  These inequalities are fair by definition.  Rawls’ contractarian 
theory provides a compelling argument against equating fairness with 
simple equality. 
On the other hand, the concept of fairness is only vague (and 
hence useless) when it is conceptualized in overbroad and fuzzy 
terms.  When properly articulated, a concept of fairness is seen to be 
a fundamental social virtue, which is a proper and legitimate concern 
of a culture’s legal institutions, insofar as the human sentiment for 
fairness is the underlying source of a basic sense of justice.175  As such, 
fairness is indeed an essential legal concept.  Seen in this light, when 
the concept of fairness, as expressed in the Cady, Roberts rationale, is 
correctly interpreted and applied, it bestows legitimacy on the 
prohibition of insider trading and is seen as a sensible and intuitive 
foundation for that prohibition. 
One broad and fuzzy interpretation of the idea of fairness is the 
equal access theory; though it is not without some degree of merit, if 
a venerable pedigree is any indication of merit.  The theory made an 
early appearance in Laidlaw v. Organ,176 a somewhat obscure opinion 
by Chief Justice John Marshall involving international politics and the 
tobacco market.  The Treaty of Ghent had just put an end to the War 
of 1812 and opened up previously closed commodities markets.  One 
effect of the treaty was an increase in demand for, and hence in the 
price of, tobacco.  The buyer in Laidlaw knew about the treaty.  He 
had received the news directly from the fleet which had brought it 
from Europe, and in fact had awoken early to conduct his business 
before the news was disseminated.177  The seller knew nothing.178  
When he asked the purchaser about any news that might impact the 
 
 173 Id. at 136–42. 
 174 See id. at 95–96. 
 175 See id. at 111–12. 
 176 15 U.S. 178 (1817). 
 177 Id. at 183. 
 178 Id. at 182–83.  An ancient permutation on the equal access theory was 
advanced by Cicero, in a scenario involving corn rather than tobacco.  After 
assembling ancient opinion on the matter, Cicero concluded that good faith and 
social harmony require a vendor to disclose to a vendee any market information in 
his possession.  MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS [ON DUTIES] bk. III, §§ 50–72.  
According to Cicero, it would be unethical “to plunder another’s ignorance.”  Id. § 
72 (author’s trans.). 
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price of the commodity, the buyer was silent.179 
Marshall decided in favor of the purchaser because the 
information concerning “extrinsic” market circumstances was 
publicly available.180  The fact that the purchaser was in an 
advantageous position with respect to the news was not 
determinative; nor was the fact that the buyer was silent in the face of 
a request for any news.  The Court essentially concluded that the 
buyer owed no duty of disclosure to the seller simply because he 
possessed an informational advantage.181 
The district judge had concluded that the vendee’s 
nondisclosure of the information constituted fraud,182 in essence 
finding a duty among all market participants to disclose material 
information.183  The lower court espoused a view that fairness 
demands equality of information in the context of contractual market 
transactions.184  This is a strong admonition, demanding not just 
equal access to information, but equal results of that access; to wit, 
parity of knowledge. Chief Justice Marshall’s resolution of the issue 
was to retreat to the less stringent (and at least conceivably 
practicable) equal access theory.  When market information185 is 
“equally accessible to both parties,” enforcing a duty of disclosure, 
Marshall argued, would be “difficult to circumscribe within proper 
limits.”186 
The blurring of fairness and equality evinced or implied in the 
opinions of both the district judge and the Chief Justice is common,187 
and persists among current-day advocates of the equal access theory.  
 
 179 Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 188–89. 
 180 Id. at 194. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Id. at 184–85. 
 183 Cicero came to the same conclusion for the sake of good faith and social 
concord.  CICERO, supra note 178, §§ 69–70. 
 184 Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 184–85.  Basing his argument on what appears to be a 
misunderstanding of Roman civil law, the district judge seems to have overlooked the 
distinction made in his sources between legal duties and moral obligations as well as 
between market information and information about the item of commerce itself.  See 
id. at 191 note c. 
 185 Marshall’s phrase is “intelligence of extrinsic circumstances,” as opposed to 
intrinsic information about defects in the item itself.  Id. at 194. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Cf. RICHARD T. LAPIERE, A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 199–200 n.8 (1954) 
(warning against confusing equality, which is “almost never found in the social 
relationships of human beings” and equity, viz. fairness, which is “everywhere and 
always insisted upon”), quoted in HELMUT SCHOECK, ENVY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOUR 282–83 (Liberty Press 1987) (1966); SCHOECK, supra, at 282 (discussing 
“[t]he confusion of justice and equality, so common today”). 
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But Marshall’s reasoning in Laidlaw has at least one virtue.  Mere 
situational advantages, such as that of the buyer in Laidlaw, are not 
the type of advantages that should give rise to a duty to disclose.188  By 
implication, there is nothing “inherent[ly] unfair[]”189 about such 
situations.  Jerry Burch exemplified this set of circumstances when he 
overheard Mrs. Yun’s telephone conversation.190  Merely standing 
within earshot of an insider while he discusses material, nonpublic 
information does not constitute the kind of relationship that gives 
rise to a Cady, Roberts duty.  Likewise, standing at the wharf when the 
fleet arrives with news that might affect market prices does not 
involve a special relationship which gives one privileged access to 
information not meant for personal use.191  In general, simply being 
fortuitously present somewhere does not give rise to any type of 
relationship that is not merely situational.  Correspondingly, 
informational imbalances are not unfair per se, but only when they are 
the result of some sort of privileged, non-situational relationship.192 
This limited notion of fairness is the essence of the Cady, Roberts 
rationale.  In Cady, Roberts, “inherent unfairness” is defined as a 
function of the relationship giving rise to the duty to disclose or 
abstain.193  An insider’s trading is considered unfair when he 
appropriates privileged information obtained as a result of his 
relationship to the corporation giving him access to that 
information.194  As one federal district court had explained a decade 
prior to Cady, Roberts: 
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a 
corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair 
advantage of the uninformed . . . .  It is an attempt to provide 
some degree of equalization of bargaining position . . . .  One of 
the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act . . . was to 
outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers . . . for 
 
 188 See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 193–94. 
 189 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 190 See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003); see also SEC v. Switzer, 590 
F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that there was no duty to disclose or abstain 
in case of famed college football coach who overheard conversation between CEO 
and his wife while sunning on bleachers behind them and then traded on 
inadvertently communicated information). 
 191 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 192 Cf. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951) (stating 
that informational imbalances are unfair when resulting from a person’s insider 
status). 
 193 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 194 Id. 
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their own financial advantage.195 
When a correct understanding of the Cady, Roberts rationale 
informs Rule 10b-5’s prohibition of insider trading, fairness, instead 
of being simply a matter of informational equality,196 is meant to 
provide “some degree of equalization”197 to compensate for the 
imbalance created by an insider’s privileged position. 
Fairness, then, like justice, aims at restoring an artificial social 
equality that is meant to correct imbalances created by certain 
morally neutral advantages, like insider status, or superior physical 
strength, so that such advantages cannot be used to the detriment of 
those less advantaged.198  Fairness can thus be thought of as reflecting 
the socio-legal process of restoring balance.199  In the insider trading 
context, equilibrium and its disruption depend on a logically prior 
imperative not to take advantage of a position of trust for one’s own 
personal benefit;200 in other words, not to breach one’s Cady, Roberts 
duty.  Seen in this light, the duty to disclose or abstain acts to limit 
the potential breadth of the fairness requirement.201 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have by and large incorporated 
this conceptualization of the rule against insider trading by requiring 
a breach of a duty of trust or confidentiality.202  The SEC, on the other 
hand, has generally eschewed restraints on the concept of fairness,203 
and instead would rather see fairness stretched to the extent that it 
becomes virtually conterminous with equality.  The equal access 
theory is the foremost manifestation of this approach to insider 
trading law.  The attempt to eliminate the intent-to-benefit 
requirement under the misappropriation theory is a nuance on the 
same theme—it is an attempt to snare those whose market advantage 
is merely situational and not a result of a special relationship as 
 
 195 Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 829. 
 196 See Macey, supra note 171 (asserting dependency of market activities on 
informational imbalances). Cf. Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1326 (“[One] strongly 
suspect[s] that disturbingly large numbers of people are actually led to trade by the 
belief . . . that they themselves have some sort of inside advantage.”). 
 197 Speed, 99 F. Supp at 829. 
 198 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 164–65 (2d ed. 1994).  In the case of the 
strong man, justice intervenes to restore social equilibrium, ordinarily by means of 
compensation, when the strong man has used his strength to injure another.  Id. at 
165. 
 199 See id. at 159. 
 200 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 201 See id. 
 202 See supra notes 134–68 and accompanying text. 
 203 See supra notes 169–201 and accompanying text. 
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defined in Cady, Roberts.204 
Viewed as a whole, the two-pronged Cady, Roberts rationale for 
prohibiting insider trading reduces in broad terms to a duty not to 
act unfairly.205  This duty is imposed only on those who have “a 
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the 
personal benefit of anyone.”206  The duty is breached by “[t]he abuse 
of informational advantages that other investors cannot hope to 
overcome through their own efforts.”207  The “inherent unfairness”208 
that the law is meant to address is a function of the Cady, Roberts 
rationale as a coherent whole, and not just the existence of 
informational inequality.  Keeping an eye on this holistic view of the 
 
 204 Looked at another way, there is nothing inherently unfair about a mere 
situational advantage, also known as luck.  Luck is by nature random.  Cf. ARISTOTLE, 
PHYSICS bk. II, ch. 5 (describing luck as a fickle and indeterminate cause).  This 
means that, over time, it will be equally distributed.  Thus, in the long term, good 
fortune is not at all unfair, even though in the short term it might befall us unevenly.  
But the fact that a particular instance of good (or bad) fortune is a random event 
means that any cries of “unfair!” in the face of pure chance can be little more than 
envy, or jealousy, as the case may be.  See generally SCHOECK, supra note 187.  If fairness 
is conceived as a matter of the just distribution of goods, see Bernard Williams, The 
Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 2D SERIES 120 (Peter Laslett & 
W.G. Runciman eds., 1962), then if good fortune is equally likely to befall anyone, 
there is simply no issue of unfairness.  A sentiment that would begrudge another his 
good fortune, with no gain to oneself, is little more than envy-fueled resentment.  See 
JOSEPH EPSTEIN, ENVY: THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS 21 (2003) (characterizing “pure” envy 
as particularly “ugly” when the envier “doesn’t even require any advantage for 
oneself but is perfectly content to make sure that the next person derives no 
advantage”); SCHOECK, supra note 187, at 19 (defining envy as the spiteful wish that 
another’s possessions or achievements be taken from him with no corresponding 
benefit to the envier).  It has been argued that envy is a universal and essential 
human characteristic that is too often overlooked by social scientists.  SCHOECK, supra 
note 187, at 34.  Envy conceivably provides at least a partial explanation of social 
phenomena as disparate as black magic and progressive income taxes.  See generally id.  
In fact, Freud, with characteristic audacity, derives the very institution of human 
justice from primordial feelings of envy.  SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 67 (James Strachey, trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1989) 
(1922). See also EPSTEIN, supra, at 21 (noting the blurry line between a sense of 
injustice and feelings of envy).  But even apart from such a bold theory, there is little 
doubt that envy plays some role in the opprobrium with which society views insider 
trading.  See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1329 (suggesting that envy plays role in 
society’s disapproval of insider trading).  When this envy is directed at actual 
wrongdoing, it can be deemed constructive, or legitimate envy.  See SCHOECK, supra 
note 187, at 296.  Misdirected, however, envy has no redeeming social value. 
 205 Cf. John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: 
A SYMPOSIUM 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (positing a “prima facie duty of fair play” for 
social interaction in general). 
 206 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 207 H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 5 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2278. 
 208 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
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prohibition against insider trading, as grounded in the Cady, Roberts 
opinion, an informed and coherent understanding of the scope and 
meaning of the intent-to-benefit rule should come into view. 
III.  THE INTENT-TO-BENEFIT REQUIREMENT FOR TIPPEE LIABILITY 
The Yun case involved the tipping of inside information.209  The 
alleged inside trader (Jerry Burch) was not an actual insider, but 
received inside information from a putative insider (Mrs. Yun).  
Under the Cady, Roberts rationale, properly understood,210 trading in 
securities is proscribed only when it would be inherently unfair.  
Inherent unfairness, in turn, results from a breach of a duty of trust, 
and not simply when an informational imbalance inheres in a given 
trade.  Thus, unless a fiduciary-like duty could be imputed to Jerry 
Burch with respect to his relationship with Mrs. Yun, there should be 
no liability for insider trading.  The intent-to-benefit rule is one 
means of imputing such a duty between a tipper and his tippee. 
The prohibition of insider trading would be a dead letter unless 
there were rules covering tippees—persons who obtain inside 
information from those having the requisite relationship of access, 
and hence a Cady, Roberts duty to disclose or abstain, but who 
themselves have no such relationship, and therefore no 
corresponding Cady, Roberts duty.211  In the context of the classical 
theory, the Supreme Court deftly212 addressed this matter by holding 
that an insider’s Cady, Roberts duty is transposed to a tippee when the 
tip was made with an improper motive to personally benefit the 
tipper in some way, and the tippee knew of the impropriety.213  This 
standard for tippees is at the same time a sensible expansion and 
limitation of liability.  As noted, a doctrine expanding liability to 
tippees is necessary if the prohibition is to have any teeth.  And since 
Cady, Roberts bases insider trading liability on misconduct vis-à-vis a 
relationship of trust, a tippee, like anybody, may only be implicated 
for insider trading if he can also be implicated in a breach of that 
trust.  The intent-to-benefit rule of Dirks provides a test to determine 
 
 209 See supra Introduction. 
 210 See supra Part II. 
 211 Cf. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 (concerning relationships giving access to 
inside information either “directly or indirectly”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) 
(prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive devices either “directly or indirectly”). 
 212 But cf. Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1339 (arguing that personal benefit test 
never amounted to the refining concept that the Court had hoped it would). 
 213 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660–61 (1983); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 72–96. 
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whether or not such an imputation is justified. 214 
The improper motive test, or personal benefit test, relates 
directly to the issue of fairness, which arguably is the doctrinal pillar 
upon which insider trading law is poised.215  The test ties in directly 
with the Cady, Roberts prohibition against an insider taking advantage 
of  “information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”216  As 
formulated in Dirks,217 the rule against insider trading is designed to 
exonerate tippees who did not gain possession of the information as a 
result of wrongdoing.218  Ronald Secrist, for example, was not abusing 
his insider status for improper personal gain,219 and hence the Cady, 
Roberts concern with fairness, that is, with restraining abuses of 
relationships of confidence, was not implicated. 
Dirks was brought under the classical theory of insider trading.220  
In Yun,221 the SEC argued that the intent-to-benefit requirement for 
tippee liability set forth in Dirks did not apply in misappropriation 
cases because the basis of the misappropriation theory was distinct 
from that of the classical theory under which the Dirks rule had been 
articulated.222 The SEC suggested that the intent-to-benefit 
requirement was “inextricably linked to” duties owed to corporate 
shareholders and that, since the justification of the misappropriation 
theory is that the trader owes no such duties, the benefit rule was 
inapposite.223 
There is no justification, however, for this different treatment of 
 
 214 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660–61.  The additional requirement of knowledge on the 
part of tippees is somewhat ambiguous but adds little to the analysis.  When the 
analytically prior breach of duty by the insider is present, knowledge by the tippee is 
unlikely to be an issue.  It seems to amount to no more than knowing that the insider 
is deliberately conveying inside information to the tippee.  All of the cases to date 
analyzed by this author that exonerate tippees are based not on the lack of an 
appropriate state of mind on the part of the tippee, but on the fact that there was no 
breach by the insider in the first place.  See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (finding no 
breach by insider, therefore no tippee liability); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 
551 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding no per se duty owed to family members, therefore no 
breach); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (finding no breach 
when insider talking to his wife is unwittingly overheard by a third party). 
 215 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 216 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 217 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64. 
 218 See id. at 667; see also supra text accompanying notes 72–96. 
 219 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. 
 220 Ronald Secrist, the alleged tipper, was an insider of Equity Funding, and the 
ultimate tippees traded in the stock of Equity.  Id. at 648–49. 
 221 Yun, 327 F.3d 1263. 
 222 See id. at 1275. 
 223 Id. 
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the misappropriation theory, which has been described as “the 
abstain or disclose theory’s fiduciary cousin.”224  In repeatedly 
requiring a breach of a fiduciary duty as a prerequisite to a Rule 10b-5 
violation, the Supreme Court is faithfully following the rule as 
originally interpreted in Cady, Roberts.  There is no Cady, Roberts duty 
unless there is a relationship giving access to privileged 
information.225  Relationships of this sort are very often fiduciary in 
nature.  But even when they are not, strictly speaking, state-law 
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders, they are sufficiently fiduciary-
like that the presence of a fiduciary duty is a reliable indicator of a 
coexisting Cady, Roberts duty.226  By confusing the indicator (fiduciary 
duty) with the thing indicated (Cady, Roberts duty) courts sometimes 
took it for granted, without comment, that the duties in question 
were owed to shareholders qua shareholders.227  But the Supreme 
Court has noted that the two duties are not identical.228 
 
 224 Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1334. 
 225 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
 226 Cf. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (“The misappropriation theory is thus designed to 
‘protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by ‘outsiders’ . . . who 
owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation’s shareholders.’”) (emphasis 
added). 
 227 This also treats federal insider trading law as an aspect of state corporate law, 
an approach which the Supreme Court has rejected.  Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462 (1977).  Keeping the Cady, Roberts duty to all market participants 
distinct from corporate officers’ state-law fiduciary duties to shareholders helps 
assuage the criticism that the Supreme Court has completely ignored the federalism 
concerns it raised in Santa Fe.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 111–12. 
 228 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (noting that Cady, Roberts duty is 
distinct from state-law fiduciary duties owed by corporate managers); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 152–65. 
Characterizing duties under the classical theory as owed to one type of entity 
(the corporation whose stock is being traded) and under the misappropriation 
theory as owed to another (the corporate source of the information) also makes it 
tempting to view liability under the two theories as, respectively, agency-based and 
property-based.  Though nothing conceptually prevents a separate action for 
misappropriation of trade secrets or conversion of corporate property, when such 
theories are feasible (which will not always be the case), section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
are not concerned with theft, at least not directly, but with duties of fairness owed to 
investors by those in privileged positions.  See discussion supra Part II.  “[I]nsider 
trading is prohibited to protect against unfairness.”  Langevoort, supra note 127, at 
1334.  The policy goal of Rule 10b-5, as originally interpreted in Cady, Roberts, is to 
enforce duties of fairness owed to the investing public (whose status as shareholders 
of one entity or another is simply incidental) by those who would abuse positions of 
privileged access to information.  See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.  While 
intellectual property law can be a more or less relevant aspect of insider trading law 
(under both theories) it cannot be said that insider trading law is property-based.  
Ostensibly, it is fraud-based.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Donald 
C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 
70 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (1982) (arguing that fraud basis of insider trading law is really 
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Moreover, in O’Hagan, Justice Ginsburg took care to emphasize 
the symmetrical relationship between the misappropriation theory 
and the classical theory: 
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to 
capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale 
of securities.  The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s 
breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; 
the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of 
nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of a 
duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the 
information.  The misappropriation theory is thus designed to 
protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by 
“outsiders” to a corporation who have access to confidential 
information that will affect the corporation’s security price when 
revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that 
corporation’s shareholders.229 
The Court’s language makes it clear that the misappropriation 
theory is motivated by the same concerns, and meant to address the 
same ills, as the classical theory.230  Indeed, one can say that they are 
not really separate theories at all, but the same theory applied to 
different circumstances.  The classical theory is designed to net the 
actual corporate insider.231  The misappropriation theory, on the 
other hand, is meant to snare the outsider who, for all practical 
purposes, should be treated as an insider, because his conduct 
contravenes the Cady, Roberts proscription and its foundational 
concern with the unfairness that results from the abuse of certain 
privileged relationships.232  There is no reason why the Cady, Roberts 
prohibition should not extend to abuses of special relationships that 
give access to information that would otherwise escape sanction 
simply because of the fact that violated duties run to certain persons 
rather than to others.  As Chief Justice Burger saw it, “Congress 
 
a version of constructive fraud).  But cf. Raymond L. Baribeault, Jr., Note, Insider 
Trading: The Current Move Toward Increasing Civil and Criminal Liability for an Ill-Defined 
Crime and the Need for a Definition, 14 VT. L. REV. 79, 79 (1989) (“[C]ourts have failed 
to develop any rational principles in applying the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act . . . to insider trading.”). 
 229 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53 (alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 230 The misappropriation theory is entirely consistent with Chairman Cary’s 
project for a broad federal common law of insider trading.  See Langevoort, supra 
note 127, at 1323. 
 231 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 232 Under both theories the misused information has been misappropriated.  This 
detracts somewhat from the significance of the label “misappropriation theory” as 
characterizing only one of the two theories. 
  
294 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:263 
cannot have intended one standard of fair dealing for ‘white collar’ 
insiders and another for the ‘blue collar’ level.”233 
What Justice Ginsburg refers to as complementarity in O’Hagan 
is explicable in terms of the “open texture”234 of Rule 10b-5.  All laws 
are beset by some degree of vagueness, due in part to the nature of 
language.235  But it is this very vagueness that imbues law with the 
flexibility that is necessary to meet the infinite variety of human 
experiences.236  The open texture of law is what keeps lawyers and 
judges out of hock, for it is the basis for the innumerable questions of 
interpretation that arise with respect to legal rules.237  The courts’ 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 provides a paradigmatic application of 
this phenomenon.238  The underlying legal precept that anchors the 
process and remains constant is the Cady, Roberts rationale 
proscribing unfair abuses of certain fiduciary-like relationships.239  As 
the courts have encountered widely divergent real-life situations 
which intuitively fall under the Cady, Roberts rubric, they have 
exploited the open texture of Rule 10b-5 in attempting to arrive at a 
just outcome.  The misappropriation theory is a manifestation of this 
dynamic flexibility.  It is not distinct from the classical theory insofar 
as both theories are rooted in the same underlying precept, which 
necessarily remains a constant throughout the interpretive process. 
In the end, Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals offered what is probably the most forceful argument against 
the SEC’s position that the two theories involve different elements of 
liability.  The judge warned that courts should avoid “construct[ing] 
an arbitrary fence” between the two theories and “unduly 
dichotomizing . . . insider trading liability,” which “essentially would 
allow the SEC and the courts to ignore precedent involving the 
classical theory of liability whenever the SEC brings its actions under 
a misappropriation theory, and vice versa.”240 
The attempt to treat the misappropriation theory differently 
from the classical theory when it comes to tippee liability is little more 
than an effort to supplant the Supreme Court’s careful and 
deliberate refinement of the Cady, Roberts rationale and to resurrect 
 
 233 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 234 HART, supra note 198, at 128. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See id. at 128–29. 
 237 See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1340. 
 238 See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. S7 (1993). 
 239 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912; see also discussion supra Part II. 
 240 SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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the ill-defined and unsophisticated equal access theory, which the 
Court resolutely rejected in Chiarella.241  Like the equal access theory, 
a theory that would implicate a trader whose informational advantage 
was gotten simply by virtue of his “position in the market”242 is an ill-
fated and misguided attempt to equalize market risks.  As long as 
Cady, Roberts is to be taken seriously as providing the doctrinal 
justification for a ban on insider trading, any such attempts at market 
equalization should be rejected as incompatible with the objectives 
and motives of insider trading law. 
The case of Donna Yun and Jerry Burch243 provides an apt 
practical illustration of why the two theories should not be doctrinally 
bifurcated, and demonstrates that the intent-to-benefit test must be 
applicable under both theories if logical absurdities are to be 
avoided.  If Mrs. Yun herself had traded on the information conveyed 
to her by her husband, she would have to be held liable under the 
misappropriation theory, since the prerequisite breach of duty by her 
husband was lacking.244  But Mrs. Yun did not trade.  Instead, she 
tipped Jerry Burch in either (or both) of two ways: either 
inadvertently while talking on the telephone,245 or purposefully 
during a cocktail party.246  Under the SEC’s theory, these two 
situations should be treated no differently from each other, at least as 
far as Burch is concerned.  Since there would be no intent-to-benefit 
requirement, it would make no difference whether Mrs. Yun 
deliberately tipped Burch for some personal reason or inadvertently 
leaked the information while conversing on the telephone.  But 
assume, arguendo, that Burch himself directly overheard the 
conversation between the Yuns and then traded on what he had 
gleaned.  Since Burch owed no duties to the source of the 
information (Mr. Yun and Scholastic Books) he would be off the 
hook.  And yet there is no substantial difference between the 
circumstances of Burch overhearing Mrs. Yun’s conversation with her 
lawyer and overhearing her conversation with her husband.  In both 
situations he benefited from a mere situational advantage.247  But, 
depending on which conversation he overhears, he is liable in one 
 
 241 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231. 
 242 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 n.14. 
 243 See Yun, 327 F.3d 1263. 
 244 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997). 
 245 Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268. 
 246 SEC v. Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1356–57 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated by Yun, 
327 F.3d 1263. 
 247 Cf. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
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case but not in the other.248  This reductio ad absurdum is a further (and 
final) verification of the weakness of the SEC’s position in Yun. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cady, Roberts decision not only set the stage for federal 
insider trading law; it has also directed the interpretation of Rule 10b-
5 for roughly the past half century.  The decision articulated the 
rationale for prohibiting insider trading which still drives courts’ 
thinking on the matter: enforcing duties of fairness in securities 
transactions against those whose positions of trust within a 
corporation give them access to information which it would be 
impossible for others to obtain legally.  To effectuate this goal, the 
federal courts have developed and applied two versions of a theory of 
liability based on the principles of Cady, Roberts.  Both involve the 
misappropriation of privileged information.  The classical theory 
applies to insiders who trade in their own company’s stock.  The 
misappropriation theory expands the insider trading rule to cover 
those who are not insiders in the classical sense, but who benefit from 
some relationship giving them access to nonpublic corporate 
information.  Other than having different objects, the theories are 
indistinguishable in their goals and motivation.  Treating the two 
theories as having different requirements, and in particular different 
state-of-mind standards for tippee liability, threatens to fragment and 
complicate an area of law that already suffers from an acute identity 
crisis.249  Until Congress or the Securities and Exchange Commission 
promulgates a new, hopefully more focused and precise legislative or 
regulatory statement on insider trading, the present body of doctrine 
must be applied as coherently and consistently as possible in order to 
further the policy goals first set forth by Chairman Cary and 
seemingly agreed upon, at least by tacit implication, by the majority 
of jurists and lawmakers.250  Distinctions as to the elements of a cause 
of action under the different theories of liability should be avoided 
absent a substantive doctrinal justification.  In the case of the 
 
 248 This odd result is exacerbated by the fact that, in the hypothetical scenario, 
Burch got his information from an actual agent of the corporation, and is 
exonerated, while in the actual case he would be liable for trading on third-party 
hearsay, which would generally be somewhat less reliable and might amount to no 
more than rumor or speculation.  See Stuart Sinai, Rumors, Possession v. Use, Fiduciary 
Duty and Other Current Insider Trading Considerations, 55 BUS. LAW. 743, 743 (2000) 
(“When is it appropriate for prosecutorial discretion to turn trading in securities 
about which rumors and speculation abound, into a crime?”). 
 249 Cf. supra note 228. 
 250 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 67, 71 (1988) (discussing interpretive value of congressional inaction). 
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personal benefit test for tippee liability, no such justification has been 
put forth; nor is one likely to be.  In sum, any attempts to 
misappropriate the misappropriation theory from its Cady, Roberts 
foundations must remain unsuccessful.  Although the majority of 
judicial opinion is in accord with this view of the matter, there is 
some disagreement.  The resolution of this disagreement becomes 
clear when it is seen that the misappropriation and the classical 
theories of insider trading liability are two sides of the same Cady, 
Roberts coin—which, at least for now, is the coin of the realm. 
 
